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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
S'TATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE- KANAB FREIGHT
LINES, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vs.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, and HAL S. BENNETT,
DONALD flACKING and JESSE R.
S. BUDGE, Commissioners of the
Public Service Commission of Utah,
and A. B. ROBINSON, doing business
as A. B. ROBINSON TRUCK LINE,

Case No.

8941

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
~I

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is before the Supreme Court on a Writ of
Review directed to the defendants, and for purposes of
reviewing an order of the Public Service Commission
of Utah dated June 30, 1958, which granted to defendant
A. B. Robinson, doing business as A. B. Robinson Truck
Line (hereinafter referred to as defendant Robinson)
Contract Carrier Permit No. 475, embracing operating
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2
rights hereinafter set forth. Contract Carrier Permit
No. 475 reissues previous contract carrier authority
held by defendant Robinson, and adds new authority
granted in this proceeding, thus consolidating all authority in one permit (Tr. 139).
Contract Carrier Pern1it No. 475 includes the following contract carrier authority in intrastate cmmnerce
previously held by defendant Robinson: for Safeway
Stores, Inc., Salt Lake City, for the transportation of
groceries, produce, meats and grocery supplies between
Salt Lake City and Richfield, serving the off-route point
of Mt. Pleasant; for Western Crean1ery Company of
Salt Lake City, for the transportation of crean1ery products and supplies between J\1:onroe and Salt Lake City;
and for John Christensen Hardware Co. of Richfield,
for the transportation of general hardware and machinery between Salt Lake City and Richfield. New and additional contract carrier authority was granted in Permit
No. 475 to transport for Bill Winkel Distributing Co. of
Richfield, beer, candy, grocery ite1ns and general comInodities between Richfield and Salt Lake City; and to
transport for Richfield Auto Parts Cmnpany of Richfield
oxygen and acetylene cylinders and general auto parts
from Salt Lake City to all points between Salt Lake City
and Richfield serving the off-route "town'' of Gunnison,
Utah.
The application (Tr. 109) sought a per1nit as a contract carrier to transport general cmnnwdities frmn Salt
Lake City to Monroe, Utah, serving the off-route points
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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or Hichfield and Gunnison. Notice of hearing on the
application (Tr. 113) generally conforms to the application. rrhe Report and Order of the Commission (Tr. 136)
in its conclusion, paragraph (e), grants to Richfield Auto
Parts Co., authority to transport oxygen, acetylene cylinders and general auto parts to all points between Richfield and Salt Lake C~ty, serving the off-route town of
Gunnison (Tr. 139). Also the Report and Order (Tr.
137) found that there was no contract existing between
applicant and Brooklawn Creamery Company and cancelled the previous permit authorizing service for such
shipper. That part of the application which sought authority to transport commodities for Nielson Furniture
and Hardware Company of ·Monroe was denied, and no
testimony was offered in support of a contract carrier
permit for this shipper.
Hearing before the Commission was held on May
23, 1958, upon the application filed April23, 1958, and ~he
report and order was issued June 30, 1958.

·Mr. A. B. Robinson appeared as the operating witness for defendant and testified as to the present and
proposed operation ( Tr. 6 to 42). While defendant Robinson holds authority as hereinabove indicated, the basic
contract carrier operation now conducted by him involves
a weekly haul from Monroe to Salt Lake City for the
Western Creamery Company, with an occasional haul
for that cornpany in addition to the weekly schedule. His
transportation for Safeways, Inc., from Salt Lake City
to Richfield appears uncertain and unscheduled. No
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transportation for Safeways, Inc., was perfonned during
the first five months of 1958, and during 1957 the average
move was about one trip per month, producing a gross
revenue for the year 1957 of approximately $3,000.00 (Tr.
24). Transportation for John Christensen's Hardware
Co. of Richfield is of the same nature, and during 1957
only eight to ten tons, equivalent to one full load, were
hauled for this store (Tr. 26). The cancellation of Permit No. 365, which authorized Robinson to transport for
Brooklawn Creamery Company, was based upon the fact
that the contract between Brooklawn Creamery and defendant Robinson was no longer in effect (Tr. 137). It
also appeared that sometime prior to hearing, although
defendant could not recall the precise date, he had ceased
to haul for Brooklawn Crearnery Con1pany (Tr. 21, 22)
and that the reason the transportation had stopped was
because defendant would not transport except at an
increased rate, which Brooklawn Crean1ery refused to pay
(Tr. 22, 24). The Commission at about the same time
issued contract carrier authority for such transportation
movement to one Charles Taylor (Tr. 21).
Defendant Robinson does not propose to add any
equipment, drivers or other trucking facilities in the
event the application is granted, but sin1ply seeks to secure for hin1self a back haul fron1 Salt Lake City to Richfield for his trucks, following con1pletion of a transportation haul to Salt Lake City fr01n Richfield for \Yestern
Creamery C01npany. The evidence n1ade clear that the
transportation for Richfield Auto Parts Co. would conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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si~t

ahnost exclusively of oxygen and acetylene container~

with smne welding equip1nent (Tr. 52) and such company
proposed to continue the use of Salt Lake-Kanab Freight
Lines, plaintiff herein. Transportation for Bill Winkel
Distributing Company will consist principally of candy
and confectionary items (Tr.16). These two commodities
would be transported from Salt Lake City to Richfield
following delivery at Salt Lake City from Richfield of the
Western Creamery Company shipment. Defendant proposes to provide new service in a backhaul continuation
of his schedule of one trip per week, with vaguely described additional transportation on an on-call basis.
He estimated that 90 per cent of the transportation under
the authority requested would be fulfilled by the backhaul to Richfield of the present scheduled weekly trip
(Tr. 18). This schedule leaves Monroe on Mondays for
Salt Lake City and returns from that point to Richfield
on Tuesday, and is established to meet the needs of Western Creamery Company. It appeared, however, that
promises had been made to both Winkel Distributing
Company and Richfield Auto Parts Company that this
weekly schedule would be adjusted to meet each of their
needs (Tr. 49, 66), although it is not clear as to what
would happen to the Western Creamery Cmnpany schedule if adjustments were so made. Moreover, it shoulcl
be noted that the transportation for all of the requested
shippers, for example Winkel Distributing Company, is
contingent upon the continuing northbound movement
of milk products for Brooklawn Creamery Company (T.r.
38). The witness stated his position would be the same
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as to Nielson ],urniture Cornpany and Richfield Auto
Parts Company (Tr. 38).
Only two shipper witnesses appeared in behalf of
applicant. Richfield Auto Parts Company, a dealer in
wholesale auto parts at Richfield, was represented by
Mr. C. G. Spencer (Tr. 42). It appeared that they desired
transportation primarily for oxygen and acetylene tanks
(Tr. 42) hauled in loads of around 20,000 pounds (Tr. 46).
This witness stated that he had been assured that defendant would change his schedule from Salt Lake City to
Richfield from Tuesday to a week-end operation ( Tr.
49). This auto supply company operates two large trucks
which are used once each week or two for transportation
of its supplies from Salt Lake City to Richfield, and
proposes to use defendant's services only for acetylene
and oxygen and some welding supplies (Tr. 52). It is
shipping all other commodities by plaintiff Salt LakeKanab Freight Lines, Inc., and finds their service is entirely satisfactory, except it would like an additional
service on Saturday night (Tr. 53). The witness of plaintiff testified that its local agent had handled emergencies
over such weekends, however, and that the service has
consistently provided pick up in the evening at Salt Lake
City for delivery the following nwrning at Richfield. It is
apparent fr01n testimony of ~lr. Spencer that this conlpany supported the application only for linlited commodities, not general auto part~ as authorized by the C01n1nission, and that the basis of such support was to secure
a cheaper rate. (Tr. 54, 55).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~Ir.

Willia1u Winkel testified on behalf of Bill

'vVinkel Distributing Cmnpany of Richfield, a wholesaler
of beer and confectionary iten1s (Tr. 59). He distributes
into southern Utah south of Gunnison from Richfield,

I'

It

Utah, and owns and operates four trucks, some of which
are occasionally used to transport his own merchandise
fron1 Salt Lake City to Richfield (Tr. 60). He has been
using the services of defendant to supplement his trucks,
and transports his beer on leased equipment, which he
would continue to do (Tr. 63). He stated that his company shipped s1nall six or seven ton ship1nents of candy,
potato chips and other such itmns from Salt Lake to Richfield, and that they have no complaint with the service of
plaintiff (Tr. 60). Mention was made of minor difficulties
in leaving confections in his home-store driveway when
no one was there to receive the1n, but this way specifically
denied (Tr. 65) by the Richfield agent of defendant, and is
further detailed in the argument.
The operating testimony of the plaintiff herein
shows that it operates a common carrier between Salt
Lake
City and -Richfield, among other points, serving
intermediate points under Certificate and Convenience
and Necessity No. 1169 (Exhibit 1). It maintains extensive tenninal facilities at Salt Lake City, including
general offices, warehouse and dock with garage facilities
at 350 South 1st West Street, with telephone and teletype facilities to its various other tenninals ( Tr. 74).
Pick up trucks and tractors and trailors are stationed
at all terminals for perforrnance of pick up and de.
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livery service. ~l_lhe terminal facilities at Richfield include
a covered dock, 80 by 80 feet with access to two locked
rooms (Tr. 95, 96). There are four pick up trucks and
a tractor stationed at Richfield for local delivery service, and a telephone, agents and other personnel are
there 1naintained. Plaintiff operates several daily
schedules, with additional special schedules, between
Salt Lake City and Richfield, all more fully detailed
hereinafter.
The operating witness for plaintiff, Dale Belts, testified that this carrier has transported and is now transporting substantial amounts of freight for the Winkel
Distributing Company and Richfield Auto Parts Company and that no complaints relative to existing service
have been received from either of these companies (Tr.
82). He pointed out (Tr. 82) that the Kanab rates are
somewhat higher on volume movements than those of
defendant, for example, on 20,000 pounds the defendant's
rate is 50 cents per one hundred from Salt Lake City to
Richfield, whereas it appears that the plaintiff contracted at a 59 cents rate (Tr. 82).
Based upon past experince, the witness stated that
when contract carrier authority had been granted and
transportation perfonned at lower rates, the contract
carrier had received the freight and diverted traffic,
except when improved and 1nore constant service was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

desired, when the shippers continued using the cornmon
carrier (Tr. 83, 84). He further testified that the loss
of revenue in this area of Utah by such traffic diversion
would adversely and seriously affect the revenues of
plaintiff, and could impair its ability to continue rendering appropriate common carrer service (Tr. 84).
Mr. Joe 1-I. Fry, the plaintiff's agent at Richfield,
also appeared (Tr. 95). He described in further detail
the terminal facilities at Richfield and the means by
which freight is handled at that point. The Richfield
terminal is open normally between 6 :00 in the morning
and 6:00 at night on five days a week, and on Saturday
until 1 :00 or 2 :00 p.m. This agent is listed in the telephone book, lives within five blocks from the terminal,
and Saturday or Sunday delivery is available if desired,
although he pointed out that the shippers generally refuse
freight on Saturday (Tr. 99). He has never had any complaint from Bill Winkel Distributing Company about the
service. Their shiprnent are usually small, and are set
forth on Exhibit No. 4. The agent had offered to set
the candy shipments in the basement or in the Winkel
garage if desired (Tr. 101), and frequently shipments
have been held in the warehouse pending notification to
deliver. As to Richfield Auto Parts Company, no complaints have ever been received on the service of plaintiff
(Tr. 103).
Following issuance of order herein, plaintiff filed
a detailed Petition for Rehearing ('rr. 142), which was
denied by the Commission on July 23, 1958, (Tr. 145).
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STATE~1:ENT

OF

POI~~TS

POINT I.
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION IN FINDING
THERE IS A NEED FOR GRANT OF AUTHORITY HEREIN
IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.
(A)

THE TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES OF PLAINTIFF ARE ADEQUATE TO MEET ALL PUBLIC
SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS IN THE AREA.

(B)

THE TESTIMONY OF SHIPPER WITNESSES INDICATES SATISFACTION vVITH PLAINTIFF'S
SERVICE, THAT ANY DESIRE FOR A NEW
SERVICE IS PREDICATED SOLELY UPON A
PROMISE OF CHEAPER SERVI•CE, AND FAILS
ESTABLISH A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL SERVICE.

(C)

THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE COMMISSION ARE BASED UPON THE PREMISE
THAT THE RATES PROPOSED ARE CHEAPER
THAN THOSE OF PLAINTIFF, WHICH BASIS
OF ISSUANCE OF AUTHORITY IS CONTRARY TO
LAW WHICH REQUIRES A FINDING BASED ON
·COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY.
POINT II.

THE A CTION OF THE COMMISSION WILL DIRECTLY
AND ADVERSELY AFFECT PLAINTIFF BY PERMTTING
THE TRANSPORTATON OF COMMODITIES WHICH COULD
AND SHOULD PROPERLY BE TRANSPORTED BY PLAINTIFF.
1
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POINT III.
THE AUTHORITY GRANTED BY THE COMMISSION
EX•CEEDS THAT REQUESTED BY THE APPLICATION AS
SET FORTH IN THE NOTICE OF HEARING, AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW, THE EVIDENCE AND THAT THE FACT
FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION IN FINDING
THERE IS A NEED FOR GRANT OF AUTHORITY HEREIN
IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.
(A)

THE TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES OF PLAINTIFF ARE ADEQUATE TO MEET ALL PUBLIC
SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS IN THE AREA.

In any proceeding seeking a permit to operate as a
contract carrier, the burden of proving that existing
transportation facilities do not provide adequate and
reasonable service is placed upon the applicant, and a
mere showing of convenience or benefit to the applicant
or to a few shippers is not sufficient basis for the granting of a permit. See Wycoff Company v. Public Service
Commision, 227 P. (2d) 323 (1951). In this proceeding
before the Commission the applicant totally failed to
discharge such burden.
The evidence adduced at hearing discloses not only
the fact that the facilities provided by plaintiff are adequate to meet the shipping requirements of the area,
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but affirmatively shows the efficiency and regularity
of plaintiff's services. The facilities operated by plaintiff
include everything needed for a cOinplete carrier service.
Adequate docking and storage facilities both in Salt
Lake City and Richfield are provided, with pickup and
delivery service available and utilized at both terminals.
Agents are available, and teletype and telephone lines
are maintained between Salt Lake and all agency stops,
including Richfield (Tr. 74, 77, 95, 96).
A daily local schedule originating in Salt Lake and
terminating in Richfield is operated by plaintiff five days
a week. This schedule leaves Salt Lake City between S
and 9 p.m. and arrives in Richfield son1e six hours later,
generally between 2 :00 and 3 :00 a.m., providing Richfield
with overnight service from Salt Lake City (Tr. 72).
These schedules are normally run at less than capacity
load, but when freight in excess of capacity is tendered
an extra van is dispatched to Riehfield or the excess
placed upon another schedule passing through Richfield
that night (Tr. 73, 104). Additional sehedules on which
Richfield freight can be transported leave Salt Lake
City and pass through Richfield daily, leaving freight
at the Richfield tenninal. These include a daily run to
Kanab five days a ·week and t\YO or three daily schedules
to Phoenix, Arizona. The same daily sehednles operate
northbound to Salt Lake out of Richfield, l(anab and
Phoenix (Tr. 73, 74). Saturda~~ serYiee to Richfield is
regularly provided every 'n•ek hy a .. eleanup" schedule
which picks up freight in Salt Lake City on Saturday
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and delivers this freight to various towns, including
Richfield, Saturday night. Freight delivered on this
shipment is available for Sunday delivery if necessary
(Tr. 73).
All equipment necessary for an efficient pick up
and delivery service is maintained at each terminal point.
At Richfield this includes four pick up trucks and a
tractor. The Salt Lake terminal has twelve pick up trucks
and a number of tractors and trailers (Ex. 1, Tr. 77).
To provide the most rapid service possible, the Salt
Lake terminal picks up freight at late as 8 :00 p.m. for
shipment out to Richfield that night, and the Richfield
station is open until 6:00p.m. (Tr. 75). An effective procedure is in use to handle emergency deliveries and to
insure Saturday delivery on freight leaving Salt Lake
City Friday night when required, and weekend or holiday
shipments are regularly accomodated by plaintiff in its
operation. Saturday morning the trailers are each opened
and checked for perishables and rush items (Tr. 97).
The facilities offered and now operated by plaintiff are more than adequate to meet the needs of any
and all shippers in the Richfield area. It is difficult to
see how faster, more dependable, regular service could
be obtained. Yet an essential part of the findings of
the Commission was that the available facilities from
Salt Lake City to Richfield are not adequate. In paragraph 4 of its findings the commision in effect says this,
where it states ". . . there is a need for the type of
service applicant can provide ... "Applicant offers only
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to provide a weekly return haul service on an unspecified
day with other trips on call from Salt Lake City to
Richfield. Clearly the finding that this service is needed
has no basis in the evidence and is completely contrary
thereto.
(B)

THE TESTIMONY OF SHIPPER WITNESSES INDICATES SATISFACTION WITH PLAINTIFF'S
SERVICE, THAT ANY DESIRE FOR A NE\V
SERVICE IS PREDICATED SOLELY UPON A
PROMISE OF CHEAPER SERVI·CE, AND FAILS
ESTABLISH A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL SERVICE.

The testimony of defendant's shipper witness C.
G. Spencer, operator of the Richfield Auto Parts Co.,
conclusively demonstrates both the adequacy of and
satisfaction with plaintiff's operation and the motive
for requesting the additional service. Spencer testified
that plaintiff now hauls 80o/o of the freight handled by
the Richfield Auto Parts Co. (Tr. 44). His testimony
that the delay over the weekend when shipping with
plaintiff requires h:lln to run his own trucks for oxygen
and acetylene (Tr. 49) is totally negatived by his own
later ad1nission that he 1nakes this trip only once every
week or two ( Tr. 50). Such a schedule cannot be reconciled with any urgent need for rush delivery. In
addition, the evidence totally failed to disclose any request by Spencer for any Saturday or emergency deliveries which had been refused by plaintiff (Tr. 53). As
has been shown, plaintiff regularly makes a Saturday
delivery to the terminal at Richfield and upon request
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the agent there makes delivery to the consignee. In light
of his own testimony, the witness' staternent that such
service is needed must be discounted. The real reason
for Spencer's concern was made evident upon cross
examination. At pages 50 and 51 of the transcript the
following appears:

"Q. And the reason, as I understand, that
you would use the services of Mr. Robinson is
because of the fact that you feel fifty cents a
hundred would be cheap enough so that you could
use a carrier~
A.

That's right."

No request has been made of plaintiff by Spencer
for a cornmodity rate, which is available, on oxygen and
acetylene tanks for the past year and a half (Tr. 56).
Further, on cross examination Spencer demonstrated that
any convenience promised by defendant Robinson was
no different from service now made available by plaintiff. Spencer said defendant Robinson would, under the
changed schedule, pick up his merchandise in Salt Lake
on Saturday and deliver it to Richfield Saturday night
(Tr. 51). As indicated, this service is already provided
by plaintiff (Tr. 89).
The same conclusions are evident from an examination of the testimony of William Winkel, defendant's
shipper witness representing Bill Winkel Distributing
Company. The Bill Winkel Distributing Cornpany is now
using plaintiff's trucks for shipping freight into Rich-
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field and the service provided by plaintiff, by Winkel'8
own admission, has been satisfactory ( Tr. 63). Some
testimony was offered by the witness indicating candy
had been left in· the sun by plaintiff and had spoiled
(Tr. 67). But Winkel then testified that when the candy
spoils he files a claim with plaintiff and no claim had
been filed by him for that reason during the years 1957
and 1958 (Tr. 68). Winkel also testified that when requested plaintiff has stored shipments for him while he
was out of town (Tr. 65), demonstrating plaintiff's
ability to accomodate the needs of this shipper. Winkel's
testimony concerning the service Robinson proposes to
perform for him discloses that Robinson will bring his
freight directly to his house (Tr. 66). That this service
is already provided for Winkel by plaintiff is apparent
from the testimony given by plaintiff's Richfeld agent,
Joe H. Fry. At page 101 of the transcript Fr:- testified
as to his service for Winkel:
" ... He has requested that we hold freight
there, him being out of town, which ''"'"e have done,
and delivered at his convenience, nor ours-and
most of his candy when he isn't there goes through
the window. I pass it through the '\\rindow to his
wife and she sits it is the basement. He gets quite
a few neon signs and that, and that goes out to
his garage.''
Winkel's own description of his operation

d~mon

strates that his ship1nenb:1 are generally not of an urgent nature, and when they are, the service provided
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by plaintiff
testified:

IS

used. At page 61 of the transcript he

"The way I work when I come in with a truck.
I order my merchandise to hit Salt Lake at about
the time I figure my truck will be there. Sometimes it doesn't quite hit there, and if it doesn't,
then I give the orders to ship Salt Lake-Kanab,
or I have it come in open, with the instructions
that when I leave from these freight houses that
if it comes in specific shipments to shoot it on
down. But, it is marked "will call" a lot of that,
and if I need it before I come back in, then I
instruct them to ship it Salt Lake-Kanab."
With the service proposed by Robinson already
being provided by plaintiff one must look elsewhere for
Winkel's motive in appearing in support of the application. Wnkel testified that the rate proposed by Robinson
is less than that charged by plaintiff ( Tr. 65), and this
rate is what would induce him to ship with Robinson
(Tr. 68). He further stated if the Robinson rates were
the same as those of plaintiff he would go back to using
his own trucks (Tr. 68).
In short, there is total failure to show any inadequacy of existing service, and not a scintilla of evidence
upon which the Commission could have justified its
grant of authority.
(C)

THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE COMMISSION ARE BASED UPON THE PREMISE
THAT THE RATES PROPOSED ARE CHEAPER
THAN THOSE OF PLAINTIFF, WHICH BASIS
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OF ISSUANCE OF AUTHORITY IS CONTRARY TO
LAW WHICH REQUIRES A FINDING BASED ON
·COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY.

It is readily apparent that the Commission has
granted authority solely upon the premise that cheaper
rates would thus be available to shippers, notwithstanding the power and obligation of the Commission to
regulate rates, and upon the further premise hereinafter
noted that such grant is of no consequence in any event
since it will not affect existing carriers. Such concept
is not only novel, but if followed to any extent will destroy the motor carrier industry under the syste~ of
regulation contemplated by Utah statutes.
Four elements are required to be found as conditions
precedent to the granting of a permit to operate as a
contract carrier. 54-6-8 U.C.A. (1953). These-include (1)
a finding that the roads o~ the state will not be unduly
burdened; (2) that the-proposed operation- will not interfere with the traveling public; (3) the granting of a
permit would not be detrilnental to the public interest;
and (4) a finding that the existing transportation facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable services.
Here the third and fourth elements areentirely lacking.
While it is true that this court said in the case of
Cantlay and Tanzola v. P.S.O., 233 P. (2d) 3±! (1951)
that the Commission was not required in every instance
to find all four elements or deny the pennit, that case
is easily distinguishable on its facts. In every case involving a fact situation analagous to that in this case,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
the court has found that a showing of adequate service
by an existing carrier is sufficient to bar the permit.
See Rudy v. Public Service Commission, 265 P. (2d)
401 (1954); Wycoff Co. v. Public Service Commission,
227 P. (2d) 323 (1951). Even where the existing common
carrier proposed to increase its service to render it
adequate, the contract permit was denied. See Goodrich
v. Public Service Commission, 198 P. (2d) 975 (1948).
Certainly it would not be contended that under a
showing as made by defendant here that a Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity could issue. Yet as stated
by Justice Wade in the case of McCarthy v. Public Service Commission, 198 P. (2d) 220 (1947), the showing
under our statute which a common carrier must make in
order to obtain a Certificate of Convenience and N ecessity is almost identical with the showing required of a
contract motor carrer in order to obtain a permit to so
operate. The only difference, Justice Wade stated, is
that in an application for a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity a showing of financial ablity is required.
As pointed out in Wycoff Co'. v. Public Service Commission, supra, a burden rests upon the applicant to
establish that public convenience and necessity require
the proposed services in the area. The transcript discloses no evidence tending to show that the proposed
service is required.
By granting this permit to Robinson, the Public
Service Commission has departed completely from the
statute and has created and applied a new test for
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issuing authority. This new test, that a contract carrier
permit will be granted to any carrier in need of a back
haul to sustain his operations regardless of existing
carrier facilities, is entirely without foundation in the
statute or the cases. Such arbitrary action by the Comrnission is a startling abuse of discretion.
In the findings of fact rnade by the Commission,
paragraph two (Tr. 137) indicates that the proposed
contractees will dispense with their own operations and
use Robinson for these operations if the permit is
granted. As shown above, the only reason the shippers
would do so is Robinson offers cheaper rates. No other
evidence offered would justify this finding. The need
referred to in paragraph four of the findings (Tr. 137)
has no basis whatsoever in the evidence. The findings of
fact are devoid of any finding based on evidence of inadequacy of present service or public need for the proposed service as required by law.
The fact that applicant's operation is in need of the
business (Tr. 16) is no reason for granting a permit.
The justification of the issuance of the first permit is
not at issue. That applicant cannot sustain his operation
by the contracts he has (Tr. ±0) is of no import in determining whether he should be granted a new permit.
POINT II.
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION WILL DIRECTLY
AND ADVERSELY A!FFECT PLAINTIFF BY PERMTTING
THE TRANSPORTATON OF COMMODITIES WHICH COULD
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AND SHOULD PROPERLY BE TRANSPORTED BY PLAINTIFF.

The granting of this permit will obviously have a
serious affect upon plaintiff by the diversion of freight
plaintiff is now carrying (Tr. 84). Plaintiff's general
manager testified that in his experience with contract
carriers whose rates are lower the freight is taken to
the contract carrier (Tr. 84). As shown in Exhibit 4,
a considerable volume of freight is now moved by plaintiff for the shippers now proposing to contract with
Robinson. The loss of these accounts would obviously
have an adverse affect on plaintiff's business. It is
clear that with the rate differential offered by Robinson
much of the freight of these shippers will be diverted
to the contract carrier. The common carrier service supplied by plaintiff is a costly operation and a loss of
revenue in an area would demand a reconsideration of
the schedules and rates in that area.
Plaintiff now carries a considerable amount of goods
for Richfield Auto Parts Co. Under the permit, the
contract carrier will be allowed to carry, in addition to
oxygen and acetylene tanks, general auto parts, and will
be allowed to serve all points between Salt Lake and
Richfield. Again it must be pointed out that no application was made to serve all points between Salt Lake and
Richfield and absolutely no evidence was offered on
which to base the grant. By offering lower rates, defendant will soon ship the largest part of Richfield
Auto Parts Company freight, and the same situation
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will occur with the Bill "\Vinkel Distributing Co. No other
reasonable conclusion is possible. Plaintiff would· then
provide service only if the contract carrier were not
available.
The coinmon carrier authority held by plaintiff
contemplates transportation by plaintiff of the type of
materials here involved in this type of situation. The
finding of the Commission -that the granting of this application will not result in any substantial detriment to
any other carrier (Tr. 137) is directly contrary to the
evidence.
POINT III.
THE AUTHORITY GRANTED BY THE COMMISSION
EXCEEDS THAT REQUESTED BY THE APPLICATION AS
SET FORTH IN THE NOTICE OF HEARING, AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW, THE EVIDENCE AND THAT THE FACT
FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION.

Under the application herein (Tr. 109) defendant
seeks authority to transport general commodities over
regular routes fr01n Salt Lake City to Monroe, Utah,
serving the off route points of Richifeld and Gunnison
(Tr. 109). The notice of hearing (Tr. 113) similarly
shows the scope of the application. However, in section
(e) of the Comn1ission's order (Tr. 139) authority its
granted to transport general c01nn1odities for Richfield
Auto Parts Co., ''to all points bettceen Richfield and Salt
Lake City, ust'ng the off ro,nte town of Gunnison."
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The cmnplete indifference of the Cmnmission to applicable decisions of this court and requirements of the
Utah statutes in this proceeding, is clearly evidenced in
its action in thus granting authority substantially in
excess of that requested in the application and as set
forth in the notice. Under section 54-6-8 and 54-6-5 U.C.A.
(1953), notice is required of the scope and extent of
requested authority. Obviously the grant exceds both
the application and the notice, and it is clear that not
only this plaintiff but other cmmnon carriers could not
anticipate the issues gratuitously established by the
Commission in its order. Other common carriers serving
such interrnediate points between Salt Lake City and
Richfield as Provo received no notice of hearing, and
may not to this date be aware of the issuance of such
authority since presumably they would not have received
a copy of the order issued by the Commission.
The action of the Commission in granting authority
neither requested nor noticed would appear so clearly
erroneous that plaintiff believes no useful purpose would
be served by further argument. The decisions of this
court are numerous on such matters and the statutes
seem more than adequately clear.
Equally disturbing, however, is the fact that there
is not a scintilla of evidence upon which a grant of authority could be based in any event. As has been noted,
the evidence shows that Richfield Auto Parts Company
proposes to use the facilities of defendant only in the
transportation of cylinders of oxygen and acetylene and
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small welding supplies (Tr. 52), between it~ store in
Richfield and Salt Lake City, Utah. This evidentiary
aspect of the matter has been found by the Commission
in its paragraph 2 of Findings of Fact (Tr. 137). It
must be also noted that the grant of authority is not
supported by the evidence since it is clear that Richfield
.Auto Parts Co. has no complaint against existing transportation service, is satisfied with the same and proposes
to continue its use whether the application be granted or
not. The sole basis of appearance was that cheaper
rates could be secured for the transportation of oxygen
and acetylene cylinders. In addition to granting points
of service not requested by defendant, the Commission
found need where none exists. Further, it has granted
general commodity authority where the shipper only
proposed to use applicant's service because of cheaper
rates on oxygen and acetylene cylinders and occasional
welding supplies.
The action of the C01n1nission is incredible, and indicates a callous indifference to applicable case and statutory law and the evidence. The order of the Commission
in granting authority herein is arbitrary and capricious
and contrary to law.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is subn1itted that the action of
the Public Service Con1mission in granting the contract
carrier permit to defendant Robinson is arbitrary and
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capricious and directly contrary to the evidence, and
will adversely affect the operation of plaintiff in this
area. The authority allowed exceds that requested and of
which notice was given and is contrary to the evidence.
The order of the Commission should be set aside.
Respectfully submitted,

WOOD R. WORSLEY,
.Attorney for Plaintiff

701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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